### Summary
GET /api/v1/files/{id} now sets attachment filename for both Python and
Go handlers so browsers can save downloads with the correct name.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
### Summary
Fix UserFillUp crash where re.sub treated field values as regex replacements. Windows paths like C:\1files caused invalid group reference errors. Switched to str.replace for literal substitution. Regression test added.
Co-authored-by: rsnetworkinginc <rsnetworkinginc@users.noreply.github.com>
### Summary
Fix add_message so API-key callers can pass user_id (previously ignored because Python checked a Go-only flag). Now uses g.auth_type == AUTH_API. JWT/session callers stay bound to the authenticated principal. Tests added; backward compatible.
### Summary
- keep literal whitespace outside streamed message references
- retain single, double, and spaced outer-brace reference forms
- apply the same boundary rule to iteration aliases
- add regression coverage for adjacent and consecutive references
Fixes#18665
---------
Co-authored-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
### Summary
OIDC discovery builds its URL as
`f"{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration"`. Providers whose issuer
carries a trailing slash therefore get asked for a URL with a double
slash in it, which 404s. authentik is one of them: its issuer is
`https://auth.example.com/application/o/<app>/`, so the request goes to
`.../o/<app>//.well-known/openid-configuration` and login fails right at
the start with `Failed to fetch OIDC metadata`.
Stripping trailing slashes off the issuer before joining the well-known
path is enough. The `issuer` used later for ID token validation still
comes from the discovery document itself, so nothing else about the flow
changes.
Co-authored-by: Krim <git@krim.dev>
Ports the dataset knowledge compilation (wiki/graph/tree/mindmap) to the
Go scheduler with a status contract, aligns wiki storage/retrieval with
Python, and sizes prompts by content_length.
## Summary
`ComponentBase.variable_ref_patt` (and its duplicate in
`agent.canvas.Graph.get_value_with_variable`) is the regex the canvas
runtime uses to find `cpn_id@var_nm` template refs in component prompts.
The `cpn_id` half was constrained to `[a-zA-Z:0-9]+`, which silently
dropped underscores. Component ids emitted by the frontend all contain
underscores (`userfillup_abc`, `retrieval_xyz`, `llm_0`, `message_0`,
…), so any template ref like `{userfillup_abc@line}` failed to match.
The placeholder then leaked through to the LLM verbatim, and the Agent
answered only its system-prompt directive.
This is exactly the "unconsidered await response" symptom in #16758:
```
Begin(Task) -> Await response -> Agent -> Message
```
Widen `cpn_id` from `[a-zA-Z:0-9]+` to `[a-zA-Z0-9_]+`. Bare `{line}`
(no cpn_id) remains unrecognised so it stays literal until the user
wires it up — matching the existing `VARIABLE_REF_PATTERN` shape used by
`agent.dsl_migration` for the same purpose.
## Changes
- `agent/component/base.py` — fix `variable_ref_patt` class attribute.
- `agent/canvas.py` — same fix applied to the inline regex inside
`Graph.get_value_with_variable` (kept as the literal regex to avoid
coupling the two unrelated sites).
-
`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_canvas_app/test_variable_ref_pattern_unit.py`
— new regression test pinning both the regex shape and end-to-end
resolution.
## Regression coverage
```
test_variable_ref_patt_matches_underscored_component_ids PASSED
test_variable_ref_patt_still_matches_legacy_ids PASSED
test_get_input_elements_from_text_resolves_underscored_id PASSED
test_string_format_substitutes_underscored_ref PASSED
test_variable_ref_patt_does_not_match_bare_var_name PASSED
```
All five regression tests fail against the pre-fix regex (verified via
`git stash` round trip — drop fix, tests fail, restore fix, tests pass).
The two targeted existing tests in the same directory
(`test_fillup_unit.py`, `test_iterationitem_unit.py`) continue to pass.
## Repro before the fix
```python
import re
patt = r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*"
list(re.finditer(patt, "{userfillup_abc@line}"))
# => [] # <-- bug
```
## Repro after the fix
```python
import re
patt = r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z0-9_]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*"
list(re.finditer(patt, "{userfillup_abc@line}"))
# => [<re.Match object; span=(0, 24), match='{userfillup_abc@line}'>]
```
Fixes#16758
## Test plan
- [x] New unit tests pass
- [x] Reverse-apply the fix and confirm the regression tests fail (they
do)
- [x] `test_fillup_unit.py` (existing sibling suite) still passes
- [x] `test_iterationitem_unit.py` (existing sibling suite) still passes
- [ ] Project CI green
---------
Co-authored-by: Taranum01 <taranum01@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
## What
An **Await Response** (`UserFillUp`) node placed inside a **Loop** now
pauses and waits for a fresh user response on **every** iteration,
instead of only on the first one.
## Problem
When a `UserFillUp` node lives inside a `Loop`, it only paused for input
on the first iteration. On subsequent iterations the loop ran straight
through, silently reusing the answer the user gave the first time.
Root cause is in `UserFillUp._invoke` / the canvas wait-check
(`agent/canvas.py`). The wait-check decides whether to pause by calling
`Canvas._is_input_field_satisfied` on the node's form fields — a field
counts as satisfied as soon as its `value` is not `None`:
```python
@staticmethod
def _is_input_field_satisfied(field):
...
if value is None:
return False
return True
```
The same component object is reused across loop iterations, and
`UserFillUp._invoke` writes the answer into
`self._param.inputs[...]["value"]` via `set_input_value`. Nothing
cleared those values when the node was re-entered for the next
iteration, so:
| Iteration | Entry (no answer yet) | Field value | Satisfied? | Result
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | fresh | `None` | no | pauses ✅ |
| 1 | resume w/ answer | `answer` | yes | continues ✅ |
| 2 | fresh | `answer` (**stale**) | yes | continues ❌ (should pause) |
## Fix
When a `UserFillUp` is entered without a fresh user answer
(`merged_inputs` is empty), clear the retained form values so the
wait-check treats the form as unsatisfied and pauses again:
```python
merged_inputs = self._merge_runtime_inputs(kwargs.get("inputs", {}))
if not merged_inputs:
self._clear_form_values()
```
- Fresh entry / new loop iteration → no answer supplied → values cleared
→ node pauses and waits.
- Resume with an answer → `merged_inputs` is non-empty → values applied
normally, nothing cleared.
- Non-loop behavior is unchanged: the first entry already had `None`
values, so clearing is a no-op there.
`Begin` overrides `_invoke` and is unaffected.
## Tests
Added to
`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_canvas_app/test_fillup_unit.py`:
- `test_user_fillup_clears_stale_values_on_reentry_without_answer` — a
retained value is cleared on a fresh entry with no answer (loop
re-entry).
- `test_user_fillup_keeps_values_when_answer_supplied` — a supplied
answer is applied and not cleared.
All unit tests pass and `ruff check` is clean.
## Scope
This targets the Python agent runtime (`agent/`). It is independent of
any other in-flight Await Response change.
## Related issues
Closes#15375
### What problem does this PR solve?
`GET /api/v1/messages` and `GET /api/v1/messages/search` accepted
unbounded `limit` / `top_n` query parameters while other REST list
endpoints enforce `REST_API_MAX_PAGE_SIZE` (100) via
`validate_rest_api_page_size()`. Oversized values can trigger expensive
memory index queries and large result sets (DoS risk).
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `api/apps/restful_apis/memory_api.py` | Cap `limit` and `top_n` with
`validate_rest_api_page_size`; return argument error when exceeded |
|
`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_message_app/test_message_routes_unit.py`
| Regression tests for oversized `limit` / `top_n` |
### Test plan
- [x] Unit tests added
- [ ] `pytest
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_message_app/test_message_routes_unit.py`
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fixes#16168
## Summary
- Add session-scoped authorization for `GET
/api/v1/documents/artifact/<filename>`
- Allow download only when the artifact filename appears in the caller's
`api_4_conversation` message and
`UserCanvasService.accessible(dialog_id, user_id)` passes
- Deny with generic `"Artifact not found."` before storage access (no
cross-user enumeration)
- Return 4xx when the blob is missing (existing behavior preserved)
## Approach
Sandbox artifacts are runtime CodeExec outputs, not KB documents — this
uses the same session gate pattern as `agent_chat_completion`, not
`DocumentService.accessible`.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit: denied when filename not referenced in user sessions
- [x] Unit: denied when agent canvas is not accessible
- [x] Unit: authorized user receives bytes; missing blob returns
`"Artifact not found."`
- [ ] `pytest
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_document_app/test_document_metadata.py
-k get_artifact`
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Summary
Closes#15425. The agent **Invoke** (HTTP Request) component now calls
`assert_url_is_safe` and `pin_dns` before `requests.*`, matching Crawler
and SearXNG.
## Changes
- `agent/component/invoke.py`: SSRF guard + DNS pinning on outbound
requests.
- `test_invoke_component_unit.py`: unit test blocks loopback URL without
calling `requests.get`.
## Test plan
- [x] `pytest
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_canvas_app/test_invoke_component_unit.py::test_invoke_blocks_loopback_url_with_ssrf_guard`
(requires project test env / `ZHIPU_AI_API_KEY` in CI)
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fixes#14882
Agent webhook execution currently fails open when the saved webhook
`security` block is missing/empty, or when `auth_type` is set to `none`.
This allows unauthenticated webhook invocation without an explicit
operator opt-in.
This PR makes anonymous webhook access explicit:
- Rejects missing or empty webhook security config.
- Requires `allow_anonymous: true` when `auth_type` is `none`.
- Preserves explicit anonymous webhooks by having the frontend serialize
`allow_anonymous: true` when the user selects `None` auth.
- Updates webhook unit tests to cover both denied implicit-anonymous
configs and allowed explicit-anonymous configs.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix
- [x] Security hardening
- [x] Test
### Tests
- [x] `ZHIPU_AI_API_KEY=dummy uv run python -m pytest
--confcutdir=test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app/test_agents_webhook_unit.py`
- [x] `uv run ruff check api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app/test_agents_webhook_unit.py`
- [x] `npm exec eslint src/pages/agent/utils.ts
src/pages/agent/form/begin-form/schema.ts`
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Summary
- harden reopened advisory fixes across REST connector, invoke, document
downloads, and markdown rendering
- add targeted regression coverage for redirect-safe SSRF handling,
invoke SSRF checks, document access control, and markdown sanitization
- verify each referenced GHSA against the original GitHub advisory text
and align the closed-advisory plan with the implemented remediation
## What changed
- add tenant access checks to document download endpoints to avoid
cross-tenant document disclosure
- add per-hop SSRF validation, DNS pinning, redirect handling, and
redirect limits to the REST API connector
- ensure invoke requests validate and pin the resolved host and never
follow redirects implicitly
- keep the generic rate-limited request path wrapped, not just GET and
POST helpers
- sanitize markdown HTML before rendering in the highlight markdown
component
## Validation
- `cd web && npm test -- --runInBand
src/components/highlight-markdown/__tests__/index.test.tsx`
- `.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q
test/unit_test/data_source/test_rest_api_connector.py`
- targeted `test/testcases/test_web_api/...` unit additions were
reviewed, but the suite cannot be executed end-to-end in this
environment because parent `test/testcases/conftest.py` requires a local
service on `127.0.0.1:9380`
## Notes
- all GHSA entries referenced by the plan were checked against the
original GitHub advisory text, not sampled
- the closed-advisory plan document was updated locally during review,
but is intentionally not included in this PR
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fixes the PubMed tool always emitting `Authors: Unknown Authors`. The
`safe_find` closure in `_format_pubmed_content` was hardcoded to search
from the article root, so the per-author `LastName`/`ForeName` lookups
never matched.
`safe_find` now accepts an optional `base` node (defaults to `child`,
preserving the existing field lookups), and the author loop passes the
current `<Author>` element.
Closes#16328
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [x] Add test cases
### Testing
Added `test/testcases/test_web_api/test_canvas_app/test_pubmed_unit.py`
covering per-author parsing, intact title/journal/DOI fields, and the
no-authors fallback.
Before: `Authors: Unknown Authors`
After: `Authors: Furqan Khan, Jane Smith`
### What problem does this PR solve?
The Profile **Name** field currently lacks application-level validation
and allows users to save excessively long names and unsupported special
characters.
While the database enforces a maximum length of 100 characters, neither
the frontend nor backend validates nickname format before persistence.
This can result in inconsistent user data, poor user experience, and UI
layout issues when long names wrap across multiple lines.
This PR introduces consistent frontend and backend validation for
profile names, enforces length and character constraints, provides clear
validation feedback, and prevents invalid values from being saved.
Fixes#15693
### Type of change
* [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
## Summary
Fixes [#15585](https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/issues/15585).
- Route markdown preview through the shared `request` client (same as
txt/image previewers) so `Authorization` headers and interceptors are
applied consistently.
- Add a unit test covering `AUTH_BETA` token loading for embedded search
auth.
## Root cause
Search result preview for `.md`/`.mdx` used raw `fetch`, which did not
apply the same auth path as other preview types. That led to `401` on
`GET /api/v1/documents/{id}/preview` even when the user was logged in or
using an embedded search `auth` query param.
## Test plan
- [ ] Log in, run a search, open a markdown citation link — preview
loads (no 401).
- [ ] Open an embedded shared search URL with `auth` query param,
preview a markdown file — preview loads.
- [ ] Confirm PDF/txt preview still works in the same search UI.
---------
Co-authored-by: MkDev11 <89318445+bitloi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wang Qi <wangq8@outlook.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fixes#15115.
`GET /api/v1/documents/images/<image_id>` returned **Image not found**
when the thumbnail storage object key contained hyphens (e.g.
`page-1.png`). Document APIs build URLs as `{dataset_id}-{thumbnail}`,
but `get_document_image()` used `image_id.split("-")` and required
exactly two segments, so keys like `<kb_id>-page-1.png` were rejected
even though the blob existed.
This PR splits only on the first hyphen (`split("-", 1)`) and sets
`Content-Type` from the object key extension via `CONTENT_TYPE_MAP`
instead of hardcoding `image/JPEG`.
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes#15180.
`OIDCClient.parse_id_token` in `api/apps/auth/oidc.py` read the JWT
signing
algorithm from the **unverified** JWT header and passed it through to
`jwt.decode(..., algorithms=[alg], ...)` as the trust anchor. This is
the
textbook JWT algorithm-confusion vulnerability (CWE-345 / CWE-347). Any
unauthenticated client capable of reaching the OIDC callback could take
over
an arbitrary account on any RAGFlow deployment with OIDC login enabled:
1. **`alg: "none"`** — present a JWT with `{"alg": "none"}` and no
signature segment → `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=["none"])` → PyJWT's
`NoneAlgorithm` accepts the token without verification → login as any
user.
2. **RSA / HMAC confusion** — fetch the public RSA key from the
provider's
JWKS (it's public), forge a JWT with `{"alg": "HS256"}` HMAC-signed
using the public-key bytes as the secret → `jwt.decode(...,
algorithms=["HS256"], key=public_key)` → verifier accepts → login as
any user. (Modern PyJWT independently refuses to use a PEM-formatted
key as an HMAC secret, which mitigates this leg for PEM key formats;
the fix here is the only mitigation for raw / DER / JWK octet keys and
for older PyJWT versions.)
### What changed
**`api/apps/auth/oidc.py`:**
- New module constants `_ALLOWED_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS` (asymmetric-only:
`RS*`, `ES*`, `PS*`, `EdDSA` — explicitly excludes `none` and `HS*`)
and `_DEFAULT_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS = ("RS256",)` (the OIDC Core 1.0 §2
spec default).
- New helper `_resolve_id_token_signing_algs(metadata)` — intersects the
provider's advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` from
`/.well-known/openid-configuration` with the safe allowlist; falls back
to RS256 when the field is missing or contains only unsafe values.
- `OIDCClient.__init__` now stores the resolved allowlist on
`self.id_token_signing_algs` — pinned once, from a trusted source, at
construction time.
- `parse_id_token` no longer calls `jwt.get_unverified_header` and no
longer reads `alg` from the JWT header. It passes
`self.id_token_signing_algs` to `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=...)`.
`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt` still reads the `kid` from the
header internally for JWKS lookup — that's fine, `kid` is not a
security decision; the signature still proves which key was actually
used.
**`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_auth_app/test_oidc_client_unit.py`:**
- Existing `test_parse_id_token_success_and_error` drops its
`jwt.get_unverified_header` mock (no longer called by `parse_id_token`).
- `_metadata` and `_make_client` helpers grew an optional `signing_algs`
parameter so tests can configure what the discovery document advertises.
- New `TestSSRFValidation` / algorithm-confusion regression block (7
tests):
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_default_to_rs256_when_metadata_missing`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_intersect_metadata_with_safe_allowlist`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_fall_back_when_only_unsafe_advertised`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_ignores_non_string_entries`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_handles_non_list_metadata_field`
- `test_parse_id_token_passes_pinned_algorithms_to_jwt_decode` —
sabotages `jwt.get_unverified_header` to raise on call, proving the
verification path never consults the unverified header.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_alg_none` — uses real PyJWT to encode an
`alg: "none"` token; `parse_id_token` raises `ValueError("Error
parsing ID Token: …")` instead of accepting it.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_hs256_when_allowlist_is_asymmetric` —
uses real PyJWT to forge an `alg: "HS256"` token with a non-PEM
shared secret (so PyJWT's incidental PEM-as-HMAC refusal isn't what
blocks it); `parse_id_token` raises because `HS256` is not in the
pinned allowlist.
Sanity-checked end-to-end with real PyJWT outside the project test
runner:
- `alg=none` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- `alg=HS256` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- Same `alg=HS256` token + `algorithms=["HS256"]` → **accepted**
({'sub': 'admin'})
— confirming the attack path was real before the fix.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
Co-authored-by: galuis116 <contact@duerrimports.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Python implementation of the Go-based model_provider API suite.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
---------
Co-authored-by: bill <yibie_jingnian@163.com>
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